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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Appeal involves the interpretation of the applicable 
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("Malpractice 
Act"), found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 et seq. (1992) and 
(Supp. 1994). Section 78-14-3 (Supp. 1994), provides in relevant 
part: 
(10) "Health Care" means any act of treatment 
performed or furnished, or which should have been 
performed or furnished, by any health care provider 
for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's 
medical care, treatment, or confinement. 
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, 
partnership, association, corporation, or other 
facility or institution who causes to be rendered or 
who renders health care or professional services as a 
hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental 
hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory 
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, 
podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician, 
naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, 
osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-
language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified 
social worker, social service worker, marriage and 
family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others 
rendering similar care and services relating to or 
arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of 
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any of 
the above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. 
Other provisions of the Malpractice Act are considered in 
the analysis and statutory interpretation below. Additionally, 
Utah Code Ann. Titles 58 and 62A are also considered generally in 
conjunction with the Malpractice Act. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court made only one finding and conclusion when it 
ruled on the Defendants' (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
"PHP") motion for summary judgement. The trial court limited its 
ruling on the motion to its conclusion that PHP were health care 
providers within the meaning of that term in Utah Code Ann. § 78-
14-3 , "thereby depriving [the] court of subject matter 
jurisdiction." R. 1557-58, 1569. The trial court made no other 
findings or conclusions regarding summary judgment. The issues 
before this Court are therefore limited to whether the trial 
court in fact lacked jurisdiction to hear any of the claims 
brought by the plaintiff ("Platts") based upon its conclusion 
that PHP were health care providers, and whether the trial court 
erred in requiring Platts to pay the cost of a transcript of the 
summary judgment hearing. 
PHP claims that this Court should, as a matter of law, find 
that PHP and its employees are health care providers within the 
meaning of that term in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the 
"Act"), set out in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 et. seq.. PHP also 
claims that such a finding precludes Platts1 claims because 
Platts failed to meet the procedural requirement of providing a 
Notice of intent to commence action against such a health care 
provider under § 78-14-8. 
PHP purports to support its claims by arguing in conclusory 
fashion that PHP and its employees "certainly" render health care 
or professional services and that they are health care providers 
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under the language "or others rendering similar care and services 
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or 
groups of persons," found in § 78-14-3(11). Brief of Appellees 
at 22-23. PHP cites to its representation that its "on staff" 
"clinical director" is a licensed clinical social worker and that 
PHP itself is licensed by the State of Utah. JdL. at 22-24. 
PHP's analysis and statutory interpretation of the Act, however, 
is not helpful and is severely flawed. 
I. APPELLEES' ARGUMENTS FAIL BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
MALPRACTICE ACT, AS WELL AS THE STATED INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE SHOW THAT PUP ANP IT? EMPLOYEES AfiE NOT HSftl/TH 
CARE PROVIDERS 
When construing a statute, this Court "must give effect to 
legislative intent." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat. Companies, 842 
P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992). The best evidence of legislative 
intent is the plain language of the statute. Sullivan v. Scoular 
Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 1993). If doubt or 
uncertainly exists when interpreting the meaning or application 
of a statute, "the court should analyze the act in its entirety 
and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative 
intent and purpose./ff Benyon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge 1743, 854 
P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993). "For assistance in ascertaining the 
meaning of statutory language, [a court will] look to the 
background and general purpose of the statute." Versluisf 842 
P.2d at 867. 
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A. The Malpractice Act was adopted to address the problem 
of rising medical malpractice insurance 
The Appellee's arguments fail for one important reason. 
That is, the Legislature did not intend that programs like PHP 
and its counselors be covered by the Malpractice Act. The plain 
language of the statute as well as the stated intent of the 
purpose of the Malpractice Act require that there be only one 
conclusion. That is, the Malpractice Act was intended to 
encompass hospitals and health care professionals because of the 
rising cost of medical malpractice insurance. Neither PHP, nor 
persons acting as "addiction counselors" were not intended to be 
encompassed by the act, or fall within its intended purpose. 
The Malpractice Act was adopted in 1976, and was adopted 
with a preamble stating the "Legislative intent and purpose" of 
the statute. See Laws of Utah, 1976, Chapter 23, section 2. As 
passed on January 31, 1976, that preamble states: 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of 
suits and claims for damages and the amount of 
judgments and settlements arising from health care has 
increased greatly in recent years. Because of these 
increases the insurance industry has substantially 
increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. 
The effect of increased insurance premiums and 
increased claims is increased health care cost, both 
through the health care providers passing the cost of 
premiums to the patient and through the provider's 
practicing defensive medicine because he views a 
patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. 
Further, certain health care providers are discouraged 
from continuing to provide services because of the high 
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice 
insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention 
of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends 
are producing in the public's health care system, it is 
necessary to protect the public interest by enacting 
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measures designed to encourage private insurance 
companies to continue to provide health-related 
malpractice insurance while at the same time 
establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of 
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from 
private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the 
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which 
actions may be commenced against health care providers 
while limiting that time to a specific period for which 
professional liability insurance premiums can be 
reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 
This preamble also exists in the present version of the Act at § 
78-14-2 (1994 Supp.). The preamble provides assistance in 
interpreting the plain language of the Act, as well as providing 
some legislative history for assistance with any uncertainty. 
It is important to note first that PHP does not carry 
malpractice insurance or any type of professional liability 
insurance. Therefore, the very concern of the legislature does 
not arise in with entities such as PHP. As discussed below, PHP 
does not employ health care professionals, but instead, only 
refers its clients to licensed professionals when needed. 
Clients of PHP are responsible for arranging for the payment for 
any professional services which they receive as a result of a 
referral from PHP. Those professionals that PHP refers its 
clients to certainly may be covered by the language of the Act. 
However, PHP and credentialed addiction counselors are not. 
The plain language of § 78-14-3, when read with the preamble 
clearly requires Platts' proposed interpretation. An examination 
of the Act shows that it was not intended to be construed 
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broadly. Indeed, it specifically sets out a number of 
professions defining them as health care providers. 
§ 78-14-3(11) (1994 Supp.) defines "Health care provider" by 
setting out a long list of licensed professionals that are 
licensed under Title 58 of the Utah Code Ann.. Additionally, the 
wording of that provision begins: ,f/Health care provider' 
includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or 
other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who 
renders health care or professional services as a hospitalf 
physician," and the language then continues to list the other 
licensed professionals (emphasis added). Hospital is 
specifically defined in subsection (12) as an institution 
licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, the Health Care Facility 
Licensure and Inspection Act, and is the only type of institution 
mentioned in the Malpractice Act. PHP is not licensed under this 
Act, but instead, is licensed under Title 62A as discussed below. 
The language which PHP claims brings them within the 
Malpractice Act is at the end of § 78-14-3(11) and reads: "or 
others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising 
out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and 
officers, employees, or agents of any of the above acting in the 
course and scope of employment." It should be noted here that 
even though there is a statute, Title 62A, covering "day 
treatment" centers and other human services programs, the 
Legislature did not refer to that statute or to such programs. 
Indeed, as far as institutions go, the only type of institution 
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mentioned anywhere in the Malpractice Act is a "hospital." 
Therefore, the language "or others rendering similar care" means 
other licensed professionals similar to those in the list. As 
discussed below, only such an interpretation can be harmonized 
with other provisions in the Malpractice Act. 
The Malpractice Act was not meant to cover every type of 
social program, even if it deals with problem adolescents, drug 
or alcohol abuse programs or other such programs. That does not 
mean that such programs are not important. The simple fact is 
that the legislature intended to address the problem associated 
with malpractice carriers. PHP type programs and credentialed 
addiction counselors were not contemplated by the legislation. 
B. "Harmonizing" the different provisions of the 
Malpractice Act clarifies that the Legislature intended the Act 
to cover licensed health care professionals and hospitals. 
There is arguably some uncertainty in this case regarding 
the meaning and application of "health care provider." 
"Harmonizing" the other provisions of the Act, however, provides 
further support for Platts' proposed interpretation. For 
instance, § 78-14-12 (1992) provides that a prelitigation panel 
is to review the malpractice claim following the ninety day 
notice. That provision states in pertinent part at subsection 
(4) that the panels are to be composed of: 
(b) one member who is licensed under Section 78-14-3f 
who is practicing in the same specialty as the proposed 
defendant, appointed from a list provided by the 
professional association representing the same area of 
practice as the health care provider; or in claims 
against only hospitals or their employees, one member 
who is an individual currently serving in hospital 
administration and appointed from a list submitted by 
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the Utah Hospital Association . . . . 
(emphasis added). In 1994, the legislature rewrote that 
provision and subsection (4)(b) now states: 
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care 
provider listed under Section 78-14-3. who is 
practicing and knowledgeable in the same specialty as 
the proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the 
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or 
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their 
employees, one member who is and individual currently 
serving in a hospital administration position directly 
related to hospital operations or conduct that includes 
responsibility for the area of practice that is the 
subject of the liability claim . . . . 
(emphasis added). Therefore, if it is not clear from the list in 
§ 78-14-3 itself, it is clear from harmonizing these provisions 
that the legislature expected health care providers to be 
licensed as a profession like those enumerated in § 78-14-3, or 
be employees of a "hospital." A credentialed addiction counselor 
is not a licensed profession and PHP is not any type of hospital 
within any meaning of that word. 
PHP's argument that it passes as a health care provider 
under this licensing theory simply because it is licensed by the 
State of Utah fails because many different programs are licensed 
by the State and are not health care providers. PHP claims to be 
licensed by the State as a "Day treatment" facility under Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 62A-2-101 et. seq.. That section provides for 
"Licensure of Programs and Facilities." That same chapter also 
provides for licensing of "Adult day care," "Child day care" 
facilities and other social service programs. § 62A-2-101. That 
chapter does not provide for licensing of Hospitals. Therefore 
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the fact that PHP is licensed by the State as a social program, 
and not any type of hospital or institution adds further support 
that PHP is not a health care provider* 
C. Contrary to PHP's representation to this Court, it does 
not employ any licensed professionals: and even if it did, simply 
employing a licensed professional would not bring PHP within the 
coverage of the Malpractice Act 
PHP largely supports its position by relying on its 
representation that it had a licensed clinical social worker, 
Mary McGee ("McGee"), "on staff" as PHP's "clinical director." 
Appellee's Brf. at 23. Even a cursory examination of the record 
reveals that McGee was not employed by PHP and that PHP's use of 
the word "on staff" means only that PHP referred its clients to 
McGee. 
In his deposition, defendant Comins was unable to articulate 
the exact nature of McGee's relationship with PHP. It was clear, 
however, that she was not employed by PHP and that PHP would 
merely refer people to her. R. at 1085-87 (Comins' deposition). 
PHP's reference to McGee as their "clinical director" and that 
she was "on staff" is simply a semantic game and misrepresents 
her relationship as born out by the record. PHP apparently 
defines anyone as "on staff" who it may refer people to. Comins 
testified to the following in his deposition: 
Q: Do you recall if your clinical director was on staff or 
was an employee or was on a contract and just a consultant? 
A: By what you've asked, she didn't receive remuneration 
and she signed no papers. 
Q: Signed no papers? 
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A: Contracts. 
Q: No contracts? Did Turnabout at any time pay her? Is 
that what you're saying: 
A: That's right. 
Q: So she's not an employee, then? 
A: Not by the definitions that you've given me. Well, you 
want employee to mean she was paid. 
R. at 1085. When asked about arrangements with other 
professionals, Comins testified that they were by referral. R. 
at 1087. This evidence directly refutes PHP's claim that McGee 
was PHP's clinical director or supervised PHP employees in any 
way. See Appellees' Brf. at 8. 
It is very evident from the record that PHP had no licensed 
professionals employed by them, but instead, would refer clients 
to outside professionals when they felt such services were 
needed. At the very least, there is a factual dispute as to this 
question which was created by PHP's own witnesses. The only 
counselors PHP employed were called certified addiction 
counselors. In the Affidavit of Ken Stettler (licensing 
specialist with the State of Utah), attached to one of PHP's 
memoranda in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. 
Stettler states that the certified addiction counselors at PHP 
are not licensed professionals. R. 1149-50, 1200-01. They are 
not a licensed health care professional and were not intended to 
be covered by the Malpractice Act. 
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D. Changes made to the Malpractice Act show that the 
Legislature was well aware of Licensing statutes and 
intentionally omitted the human services entities found in Title 
62A 
PHP claims that under the professional licensing 
interpretation proposed by Platts, PHP qualifies as a health care 
provider. The statute covering human services entities, 62A-2-
101 et. seq., was enacted in 1988. Several changes have been 
made to § 78-14-3 since then. See Amendment Notes to S 78-14-3 
(1994 Supp.). Indeed, the legislature made changes to the Act to 
correspond with changes in Title 58, as well as for changes in 
Title 26, Chapter 21 of the Health Care Facility Licensure and 
Inspection Act. See Id. Yet the Legislature made no changes or 
additions in § 78-14-3 to correspond with Title 62A. The 
Legislature certainly knew of the Human Services licensing 
statute, and the omission of any reference to such programs shows 
the Legislature's intent that they not be defined as health care 
providers for purposes of the Malpractice Act. § 78-14-3 does 
not include "Day treatment services" provided for in Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-2-101(6) because the Malpractice Act was adopted for 
reasons that have no connection with those programs. Nothing 
from Section 62A-2-101 has been specifically added or provided 
for in § 78-14-3 even though § 62A-2-101 has been around for some 
time. 
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E. PHP/s reliance on affidavits from Utah State Agency 
employees to support its claim of being a "health care provider" 
is misplaced 
PHP relies heavily upon the Affidavits of Ken Stettler 
("Stettler") and Loretta Garcia ("Garcia"). See Appellees' Brf. 
at 9-12. Stettler is a licensing specialist for the Department 
of Human Services, and Garcia is an officer of the Department of 
Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
Id. PHP apparently urges this Court to merely accept the 
conclusions of these agency employees. The affidavits do not 
address the legislative intent or history in any way and are 
wholly irrelevant to this Court/s determination of the issue at 
hand. As discussed above, Stettler's affidavit actually supports 
Platts' proposed application of the Malpractice Act. Garcia, who 
apparently has duties associated with the Prelitigation Panel, 
states at the end of her Affidavit: 
I have been serving as the Prelitigation Specialist 
coordinating this program since October 1987 and during 
that time we have had hearings requested on almost 
every health care field defined in 78-14-3. 
(emphasis added). Therefore, even Garcia's Affidavit does 
nothing but add further support to Platts' view. 
The best definition of PHP is its own declared purpose in 
its Amended Articles of Incorporation. That reads: 
This Corporation is organized as a non-profit 
Corporation to serve the public as a support and self-
help entity for families and neighborhoods, to serve 
the public as a crisis-intervention program, 
structuring group meetings to support parents and 
spouses in demanding responsible cooperation of out-of-
control family members; to acquaint parents and others 
with community services available to meet their needs; 
to promote education of the public and our membership 
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with respect to alcohol/drug problems and/or behavior 
problems. 
R. at 1097• PHP is a self-help center that refers its clients to 
professionals for assistance with problems. It is not a hospital 
of any kind and does not employ any licensed professionals. 
PHP's supporting memoranda for its motion for summary judgement 
and supporting affidavits show as much. 
In sum, there is absolutely no indication from the plain 
language of the statute, from the legislative history, or from 
the other provisions in the Malpractice Act, that PHP, or its 
employees are health care providers as defined in § 78-14-3. 
Indeed, all such evidence clearly points to the conclusion that 
PHP and its employees are not "health care providers" under the 
Malpractice Act. The ninety day notice provision, as well as 
other provisions in that Act therefore do not apply to PHP or its 
employees. 
F. The Trial Court Made No Other Factual or Legal 
Determinations Concerning Summary Judgment and the Proper Remedy 
Is To Remand the Case to That Court For Further Proceedings. 
As noted at the beginning of the Argument section of this 
Reply Brief, the trial court specifically limited its 
determination of the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment to 
its conclusion that PHP was a health care provider. Therefore, 
the only issues before this Court are whether that determination 
was erroneous and whether the trial court erred in Ordering 
Platts to provide a transcript of the Hearing on the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. There are absolutely no other findings or 
conclusions by the trial court on the Motion for Summary 
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Judgment. Upon a determination by this Court that PHP is not a 
health care provider, this Court should therefore remand this 
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, as well as the 
discussion in Platts' opening brief, Platts respectfully requests 
that this Court find that PHP and its employees are not "health 
care providers" under § 78-14-3, and remand this case to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
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